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CONTINUITY OF 
ABORIGINAL RIGHTS 
Kent McNeil 
Note: Professor McNeil submitted this paper for inclusion in this book well before 
the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal released its decision in R. v. Marshall, (2004} 
2 C.N.L.R. 211. Cromwell ).A. 's decision for the court in that case includes 
extensive discussion of the continuity issue (at pams. 157-181); his conclusions 
on some points are substantially the same as those that Professor McNeil had 
already reached independently. The congruence between the two presentations 
is, therefore, coincidental. The version of Professor McNeil's paper published 
below takes account of, and incorporates reference to, the Marshall decision. 
On 29 April 2004, the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal the 
Marshall decision. At this writing, the appeal is awaiting oral argument before 
the Court.-Ed. 
In 1982, the existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal peoples of 
Canada were recognized and affirmed, without definition, by s. 35(1) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982. 1 Attempts during four constitutional conferences in the 
1980s to define those rights were largely unsuccessful.2 As a result, the onerous 
task of definition has been left to the courts. Since 1990, the Supreme Court of 
Canada has responded to this challenge in a series of decisions that have attempted 
to give some content to Aboriginal rights.3 In two decisions in particular, R. v. 
Vtm der Peet4 and Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,5 the Court provided crucial 
guidelines for the identification and proof of Aboriginal rights, including Ab-
original title to land. 
The Vtm der Peet and Delgamuukw decisions have already generated extensive 
discussion and commentary. 6 In this paper, I do not intend to provide any broad 
analysis of these cases, nor to revisit issues that have already been discussed in 
detail elsewhere. My goal is much more modest. I will focus on a specific aspect 
of these decisions that has not, as far as I know, received much attention: their 
discussion of the continuity of an Aboriginal right from the time it would have 
been acknowledged by the common law to the time a court is called upon to rec-
ognize ~t~ current existence as a constitutionally protected right.7 The fundamental 
issue to be addressed is this: is proof of continuity a requirement for establishing 
existing Aboriginal rights in all cases, or is it only required when Aboriginal claim-
ants rely on practices, customs, and traditions subsequent to European contact, 
or on occupation of land subsequent to European sovereignty, to establish their 
rights? I will start by examining how this matter was dealt with in Vtm der Peet 
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and subsequent Supreme Court decisions involving Aboriginal rights other than 
title to land, and then consider the reievance of continuity to proof of Aboriginal 
title by examining the Delgamuukw decision. 
CONTINUITY AND ABORIGINAL RIGHTS 
The Vtm der Peet case involved a charge laid under the federal Fisheries Act8 against 
Dorothy Van der Peet, a member of the Sto:lo Nation in British Columbia, for 
illegal sale of ten salmon. She claimed that she had an Aboriginal right, protected 
bys. 35(1) of rhe Constitution Act, 1982, to sell the salmon. ChiefJustice Lamer, 
for a majority of the Supreme Court, held that she had failed to establish an Ab-
original right to exchange fish for money or other goods. In so holding, Lamer 
C.J. created what is known as the "integral to the distinctive culture" test for 
Aboriginal rights. According to this rest, for an Aboriginal right to be established, 
it is necessary to prove that it was "an element of a practice, custom or tradition 
integral to the distinctive culture of the aboriginal group" prior to contact with 
Europeans. 9 Dorothy Van der Peet was convicted because she could not meet this 
test in respect of the Aboriginal right she had claimed. 
Although the "integral to the distinctive culture" rest has sever.U elements, 
my present concern is exclusively with its continuity aspect. Chief Justice Lamer 
began his discussion of continuity by acknowledging how difficult it might be 
for Aboriginal peoples to prove what their practices, customs, and traditions had 
been prior to European contact. 
Ir would be entirely contrary to the spirit and intent of s. 35(1) to define aboriginal 
rights in such a fashion so as to preclude in practice any successful claim for the 
existence of such a right. The evidence relied upon by the applicant and the courts 
may relate to aboriginal practices, customs and traditions post-contact; it simply 
needs to be directed at demonstrating which aspects of the aboriginal community 
and society have their origins pre-contact. Ir is those practices, customs and tradi-
tions that can be rooted in the pre-contact societies of the aboriginal community 
in question that will constitute aboriginal rights. 10 
From this passage, Lamer C.J. appears to have regarded continuity as the means 
for linking post-contact practices, customs, and traditions with pre-contact 
Aboriginal societies, so that very real difficulties of proof would be lessened. In 
other words, the requirement of continuity would appear to apply only where 
post-contact practices, customs, and traditions were relied upon, nor where an 
Aboriginal people was able to provide sufficient independent proof of pre-contact 
practices, customs, and traditions. 
In the next paragraph of his judgment, Lamer C.J. elaborated on the rel-
evance of continuity to proof of Aboriginal title. This key paragraph needs to be 
quoted in full: 
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I would note in relation to this poinr the position adopted by Brennan J. in lv!abo, 
supra, where he holds, at p. 60, that in order for an aboriginal group to succeed in 
its claim for aboriginal title it must demonstrate that the connection with the land 
in its customs and laws has continued ro the present day: 
... when the ride of history has washed away any real acknowledgement of 
traditional law and any real observance of traditional customs, the founda-
tion of native tide has disappeared. A native title which has ceased with the 
abandoning of laws and customs based on tradition cannot be revived for 
contemporary recognition. 
The relevance of this observation for identifying the rights ins. 35(1) lies nor in its 
assertion of the effect of the disappearance of a practice, custom or tradition on an 
aboriginal claim (I take no position on that matter), but rather in its suggestion of 
the importance of considering the continuity in the practices, customs and traditions 
of aboriginal communities in assessing claims to aboriginal rights. It is precisely 
those present practices, customs and traditions which can be identified as having 
continuity with the practices, customs and traditions that existed prior to contact 
that will be the basis for the identification and definition of aboriginal rights under 
s. 35(1). Where an aboriginal community can demonstrate that a particular practice, 
custom or tradition is inregral to its distinctive culture today, and that this practice, 
custom or tradition has continuity with the practices, customs and traditions of 
pre-contact times, that community will have demonstrated that rhe practice, custom 
or tradition is an aboriginal right for the purposes of s. 35(1). 11 
Although the last rwo sentences in this passage, if taken our of context, might 
be regarded as imposing a general requirement of continuity, Lamer C.J.'s com-
ments on continuity as a whole reveal that this cannot have been what he meant. 
In the first place, his refusal to take a position on the assertion by Brennan J. 
(as he then was) in Mabo that Native title can be lost by discontinuance of the 
traditional connection with the land shows that Lamer C.J. did not intend to 
make continuity of practices, customs, and traditions from the time of contact 
with Europeans a requirement for Aboriginal rights to exist today. 12 Moreover, 
we have seen that Lamer C.J.'s express reason for mentioning continuity in the 
first place was to avoid imposing impractical burdens of proof on Aboriginal 
claimants. 13 As his obvious intention was to lessen the burden of proof for Ab-
original peoples, he cannot have meant to increase that burden at the same time 
by imposing an additional requirement of continuity that would have to be met 
even' if_pre-contacr practices, customs, and traditions establishing an Aboriginal 
right could be proven independently. 14 
In cases where an Aboriginal right is established by proof of a pre-contact 
practice, custom, or tradition, it will, of course, still have to be shown that the 
present-day activity alleged to be an exercise of that right does in fact fall within 
the right's scope. 15 In other words, there has to be a sufficient connection between 
the present-day activity and the right in the sense that the activity is encompassed 
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by the definition of the right, but there is no need to show continuity between 
the two over time from contact to the present. Moreover, failure to demonstrate 
that the present-day activity is sufficiently connected with the right would not 
invalidate the right itself; it would simply mean that that particular activity does 
not qualify as an exercise of the right. 
This understanding of continuity is confirmed by the Supreme Court's de-
cision in R. v. Gladstone, 16 delivered the same day as Vrzn der Peet. In Gladstone, 
the defendants were able to prove that, as members of the Heiltsuk Nation in 
British Columbia, they had an Aboriginal right to harvest and sell herring spawn 
on kelp in commercial quantities. The evidence that led a majority of the Court 
to accept that the Heiltsuk had traded herring spawn on a commercial scale prior 
to contact with Europeans consisted of an en tty in Alexander Mackenzie's journal 
in 1793, an entry by Dr. William Tolmie (a fur trader) in his journal in 1834, 
and testimony by Dr. Barbara Lane (an expert witness). In his majority judgment, 
Lamer C.J. said that "[t]he evidence presented in this case ... is precisely the type 
of evidence which satisfies this [continuity] requirement," as described in Vtzn der 
Peet. 17 He elaborated as follows: 
The evidence of Dr. Lane, and the diary of Dr. Tolmie, point ro rqde of herring 
spawn on kelp in "tons." While this evidence relates to trade post-comacr, the diary 
of Alexander Mackenzie provides the link with pre-contact times; in essence, the 
sum of the evidence supports the claim of the appellants that commercial trade in 
herring spawn on kelp was an imegrnl part of the distinctive culture of the Heiltsuk 
prior to contact. 18 
Lamer C.J. 's decision in Gladstone therefore affirms that the purpose of the con-
tinuity doctrine in this context is to permit evidence of post-contact practices, 
customs, and traditions ro be used to prove pre-contact practices, customs, and 
traditions. 
However, in R. v. Adams, 19 Lamer C.J. appears to have placed a different 
interpretation on this aspect of his judgments in Vrzn der Peet and Gladstone. After 
concluding that the evidence showed that the Mohawks had fished for food in 
Lake St. Francis in what is now Quebec at the time of contact with the French 
in 1603 and that this was a significant part of their life from that time, he con-
cluded that this was "sufficient to satisfy the Vrzn der Peet test. "20 He nonetheless 
went on to say this: 
As part of the second stage of the Vtin der Peet analysis, there must be ''continuity" 
between aboriginal practices, customs and traditions that existed prior to contact 
and a particular practice, custom or tradition that is integral to aboriginal commu-
nities today: Vtm der Peet, supra, at para. 63; Gladstone, supra at para. 28. This part 
of the Vtm der Peet rest has been mer as well. The evidence of numerous witnesses 
at trial proves the existence of continuity .... This was the way of their ancestors, 
and these practices continued into the present. 21 
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The words I have emphasized in this passage might suggest that Lamer C.J. viewed 
his own judgments in Vrm der Peet and Gladstone as imposing a requirement of 
proof of\:ontinuity up ro the present, even where the requisite pre-contact prac-
tices, customs, or traditions have been proven. However, this interpretation should 
be rejected, as it is inconsistent with what the chief justice actually said in Vrzn 
der Peet, and with the way he applied the concept of continuity in Gladstone.22 
What he must have meant in Adams is that the present-day fishing activities of 
the Mohawks are sufficiently connected with their pre-contact fishing practices, 
customs, and traditions to come within the scope of the Aboriginal right to fish 
for food that had already been proven by the evidence. 23 
Moreover, we have seen that Lamer C.J., in Vrzn der Peet, expressly avoided 
taking a position on Brennan J .'s views in Jvfabo on the effect ofloss of traditional 
laws and customs on Aboriginal rights. In the passage Lamer C.J. quoted from 
Mabo, Brennan J. was referring not to establishment of Native tide, but to subse-
quent loss of it through the disappearance of the traditional laws and customs that 
supported it. In this respect, there is a significant divergence between Australian 
and Canadian law. In Australia, Native title rights, which include hunting and 
fishing rights as well as title to land, are based not just on the existence but also 
on the actual content of traditional laws and customs in relation to the subject 
matter of the right. 24 Australian courts have therefore taken the position that the 
disappearance of the supporting laws and customs results in loss of the right.25 
In Canada, Aboriginal rights can arise from the existence of practices that were 
integral to distinctive Aboriginal cultures at the time of contact with Europeans, 
regardless of whether those practices were governed by Aboriginal laws or cus-
toms.26 In other words, while Aboriginal laws and customs would be sources of 
Aboriginal rights, in Canada they are not the only sources. 27 
However, though proof of continuity does not seem to be a requirement for 
establishing Aboriginal rights in Canada where the requisite pre-contact practices, 
customs, or traditions have been established in another way, the question remains 
whether an Aboriginal right that was supported by a practice, custom, or tradition 
at the time of European contact could be lost in Canada if the practice, custom, 
or tradition ceased to be engaged in or followed. Although Lamer C.J. expressly 
avoided this question in Vrzn der Peet, he did say this: 
I would note that the concept of continuity does not require aboriginal groups to 
provide evidence of an unbroken chain of continuity between their current prac-
tices, customs and traditions and those which existed prior to contact. It may be 
that for a period of time an aboriginal group, for some reason, ceased to engage in 
a practice, custom or tradition which existed prior to contact, but then resumed 
the practice, custom or tradition at a later date. Such an interruption will not 
preclude the establishment of an aboriginal right. Trial judges should adopt the 
same Hexibility regarding the establishment of continuity that, as is discussed, infra, 
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they are to adopt with regards to the evidence presented to establish the prior-to-
contact pracdces, cu~toms and traditions of the aboriginal group making claim to 
an aboriginal right. 28 
Although these remarks were made in the context of proof of continuity where 
post-contact practices, customs, and traditions are relied upon, they nonetheless 
reveal that suspension of practices, customs, and traditions will not necessarily 
cause loss of the Aboriginal rights derived from them. This was confirmed by 
McLachlin J. (dissenting on other grounds) in mn der Peet, when she said: 
The continuity requirement does not require the aboriginal people to provide a 
year-by-year chronicle of how the event has been exercised since time immemorial. 
Indeed, it is not unusual for the exercise of a right to lapse for a period of time. Failure 
to exercise it does not demonstrate abandonment of the underlying righr.29 
~ut this might still leave open the possibility of an Aboriginal right being lost 
if there was an actual disappearance of the practice, custom, or tradition, rather 
than just suspension of the exercise of it. 
Before discussing further whether the disappearance of practices, customs, 
a~d traditions can cause loss of Aboriginal rights, I should point out two things. 
First, I am troubled by the very concept of disappearance in this context. Customs 
and traditions seldom disappear; instead, they undergo modification as societies 
and cultures change to take account of new circumstances.30 As for practices, they 
may cease, but what is to prevent them from being resumed at some time in the 
future? If that happens, it would seem to be more appropriate to regard them as 
having been suspended in the interim. So the distinction between disappearance 
and suspension may in fact be a false one. 
Second, I think it is essential, at the risk of repetition, to clarify the onus of 
proof in this context. If Aboriginal people rely on a post-contact practice, custom, 
or tradition, it appears from Lamer C.J.'s judgment in mn der Peet that the onus 
will be on them to prove continuity to the satisfaction of the court.31 However, if 
they are able to establish the existence of the right by direct proof of a pre-contact 
practice, custom, or tradition, then if that right could be lost by the disappearance 
of the practice, custom, or tradition (which I doubt, for reasons given below), the 
onus should be on the Crown to prove loss of the right in this way. Otherwise, 
Aboriginal people would end up having to prove that no loss of the right had 
occurred, which would involve proving continuity up to the present in addition 
to proving the pre-contact practice, custom, or tradition. As discussed above, this 
does not appear to be what ChiefJustice Lamer had in mind when he discussed 
the matter of conrinuity.32 
However, I think there are good reasons why Aboriginal rights, once estab-
lished by proof of pre-contact practices, customs, and traditions, should not be 
lost, even if the practices, customs, and traditions upon which they were originally 
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based have rrot been followed for a long time. First of all, Aboriginal rights that 
are based on, pre-contact practices, customs, and traditions would have become 
enforceable at common law when that law was received into the part of Canada 
where the right arose.33 Lamer C.J. affirmed this in mn der Peet when he said 
that s. 35 of the Constitution Act; 1982 conferred constitutional protection on 
"aboriginal rights [that] existed and were recognized under the common law."34 
In the case of an Aboriginal practice that was not rooted in Aboriginal law or 
cusrom,35 this means that juridical force would have been given to the practice by 
the common law, so that a legally enforceable right would have been created when 
the common law was received.36 From then on, the practice could be engaged 
in as of right. As a general rule, legal rights, whether derived from custom or the 
common law, are not lost as a result of non-user. In Re Yateley Common, Foster J. 
said in regard to a customary right to a common: 
A right of common is a legal right, and it is exceedingly difficult to prove that a 
person having such a legal right has abandoned it. Non-user, if the owner of the 
right has no reason to exercise it, requires something more than an immense length 
of rime of non-user. Ir is essential that it is proved to the court's satisfaction that 
the owner of the legal right has abandoned the right-in the sense that he not only 
has not used it but intends never to use it again. The onus lies fairly and squarely 
on those who assert that the right has been abandoned.37 
So non-user of an Aboriginal right, for no matter how long, should not by itself 
cause the right to disappear, any more than non-user causes other legal rights to 
disappear.38 
Conferral of common law recognition on Aboriginal rights therefore should 
be sufficient to prevent those rights from being lost without some positive act 
of extinguishment, even if the practices, customs, and traditions on which those 
rights were originally based have not recently been followed or observed. Once 
the mn der Peet test has been met by proof that those practices, customs, and 
traditions were integral to the Aboriginal people's distinctive culture at the time 
of European contact, the resultant rights would be enforceable as common law 
rights39 and so would no longer need to be supported by continuance of those 
practices, customs, and traditions.40 However, even if Aboriginal rights were based 
solely on Aboriginal custom or law (rather than on common law recognition of 
Aboriginal practices, customs, and traditions), those rights should not be lost as 
a result of not being exercised, even for long periods of time. In this respect, they 
deserve to be treated in the same way as customary rights in England,41 which, as 
we have seen, are not lost by non-user, even if not exercised for long periods of 
time.42 This is further illustrated by Lord Denman C.J.'s observation in Scales v. 
Key in 1840 that the jury's finding in that case "that the custom had existed till 
1689, was the same in effect as if they had found that it had existed till last week, 
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unless something appeared to shew that it had been legally abolished."·B In the 
more recent case of VVJ!d v. Silver, Lord Denning M.R. affirmed this approach by 
rejecting the notion that a right to hold a fair could be lost by non-user: 
I know of no way in which the inhabitants of a parish can lose a right of this kind 
once they have acquired it except by Act of Parliament. Mere disuse will nor do. And 
I do not see how they can waive it or abandon it. No one or more of the inhabitants 
can waive or abandon it on behalf of the others. Nor can all the present inhabitants 
waive or abandon it on behalf of future generations. 44 
So extinguishment of a customary right in England will occur only if the custom 
is expressly abolished by or is clearly inconsistent with a statute,45 in much the 
same way as Aboriginal rights could only be legislatively extinguished in Canada 
(prior to receiving constitutional protection in 1982)46 by or pursuant to a clear 
and plain enactment. 47 
The proposition that Aboriginal rights recognized by the common law can-
not be lost by non-user is supported by Supreme Court jurisprudence. In Sioui,48 
the Court considered whether rights that had been affirmed by a treaty between 
the Hurons of Lorette and the British Crown in 1760 were protected in 1982 
against provincial legislation bys. 88 of the Indian Act.49 Among other things, 
the Crown contended that "non-user of the treaty over a long period of time may 
extinguish its effect."50 Delivering the unanimous judgment of the Court, Lamer 
]. (as he then was) pointed out that the Crown had cited no authority for this 
contention. He then said that he did "not think that this argument carries much 
weight: a solemn agreement cannot lose its validity merely because it has not 
been invoked."51 Although this rejection of extinguishment by non-user relates 
only to treaty rights, there seems ro be no reason in principle why Aboriginal 
rights should be treated differently,52 especially given that treaties ofren affirmed 
pre-existing Aboriginal rights.53 
In summary, the concept of continuity, as formulated by Chief Justice Lamer 
in Vtm der Peet and applied by him in Gladstone, serves the purpose of lessening 
the burden of proof of Aboriginal rights by allowing Aboriginal claimants to use 
post-conract practices, customs, and traditions to prove the pre-contact practices, 
customs, and traditions necessary to establish Aboriginal rights. 54 Proof of this kind 
of continuity back in time is therefore required only when post-contact practices, 
customs, and traditions are relied upon. When, on the other hand, the van der 
Peet "integral to the distinctive culture" test can be met by direct proof of pre-
contact practices, customs, and traditions, the Aboriginal right will be established 
without any need to show continuity in the sense Lamer CJ. envisaged. In the 
latter situation, however, it will still be necessary to determine whether the present-
day activity that is alleged to be an exercise of that right actually comes within its 
scope. If it does, the next issue is whether the right had been extinguished at any 
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time prior to receiving constitutional recognition in 1982. Voluntary surrender of 
the right by treaty aside,55 it seems that the only way extinguishment could have 
occurred would have been by or pursuant to clear and plain legislation, enacted 
by a constitutionally competent legislative body.56 • • .• 
As we have seen, these principles are supported both by the Stout deos10n 
in relation to treaty rights, and by common law doctrine in relation to the con-
tinuation oflegal rights generally, including legal rights arising in England from 
custom. Once proven, customary rights conrinue, even if not exercised for long 
periods of time, in the absence of unambiguous legislative extinguishme~~· As 
with Aboriginal rights in Canada, the concept of continuity is used to faCihtate 
proof of a custom back to the time when it must have been in existence to qualify 
for legal recognition; it is not necessary to prove that the exercise of a custom, 
once shown to have existed at that time, has continued. Moreover, the onus of 
proving that a custom or an Aboriginal right has been extinguished is on the party 
so alleging, and is not easily met.57 
CONTINUITY AND ABORIGINAL TITLE TO LAND 
The Delgamuukw case arose from claims by the Wer'suwet' en and Girxsan (spelled 
"Gitksan" in the judgments) nations to Aboriginal title and self-government over 
their traditional territories in British Columbia. The Supreme Court did not 
decide the merits of the claims, in part because the trial judge had not accorded 
adequate respect and weight to the Wet'suwet'en and Girxsan oral histories.58 
However, in the principal judgment in the case, ChiefJustice Lamer did define 
Aboriginal title in reasonably clear terms and provide significant direction on 
how it can be proven. 59 
ln order to make out a claim for aboriginal tide, the aboriginal group asserting tide 
must satisfy the following criteria: (i) the land must have been occupied prior to 
sovereignty, (ii) if present occupation is relied on as proof of occ~parion pre-so:er-
eianty there must be a continuity between present and pre-sovereignty occupanon, 
b ' ' . ,· 60 
and (iii) at sovereignty, that occupatton must have been exclusive. 
The second requirement, relating directly to the matter of continuity, need be 
met only "if present occupation is relied on." In other words, in situations where 
Aborio-inal claimants are able to meet the other two requirements by direct proof 
of exclusive occupation at the time the Crown asserted sovereignty, there should 
be no need to prove continuity. 
This interpretation is confirmed by Lamer C.J.'s elaboration on the second 
requirement. Referring to his judgment in Vtm der Peet, he said that he had ac-
knowledged in that case that 
... it would be "next to impossible" (at para. 62) for an aboriginal group to pro-
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vide conclusive evidence of irs pre-conracr pracrices, cusroms and rradirions. Whar 
would suffice insread was evidence of posr-conracr pracrices, which was "direcred 
ar demonsrraring which aspecrs of the aboriginal communiry and sociery have rheir 
origins pre-conract'' (ar para. 62). The same concern, and rhe same solurion, arises. 
wirh respecr ro rhe proof of occupati?n in claims for aboriginal ride, although 
there is a difference in the rime for determination of ride. Conclusive evidence 
of pre-sovereignry occupation may be difficult to come by. Instead, an aboriginal 
communiry may provide evidence of presenr occupation as proof of pre-sovereignry 
occuparion in support of a claim to aboriginal ride. Whar is required, in addition, 
is a continuity berween presem and pre-sovereignry occuparion, because rhe relevanr 
rime for the dererminarion of aboriginal ride is at rhe rime before sovereignry. 6! 
This passage is entirely consistent with our earlier analysis of the van der Peet 
decision and with the reason why Lamer C.J. introduced the concept of conti-
nuity in Aboriginal rights cases.62 His evident intention was to make proof of 
Aboriginal rights, including title, easier by permitting evidence of post-contact 
practices, customs, and traditions or post-sovereignty occupation to be introduced 
and relied upon. He did not intend to make proof of Aboriginal rights and title 
more difficult by imposing a requirement of continuity in all cases, even when 
sufficient direct evidence of the pre-contact practices, customs, and traditions or 
pre-sovereignty occupation is available. 
Lamer C.J. went on to say that "there is no need to establish 'an unbroken 
chain of continuity' (van der Peet, at para. 65) between present and prior occupa-
tion," especially because 
[r]o impose rhe requiremenr of conrinuiry too srricrly would risk "undermining 
the very purpose of s. 35(1) [of rhe Constitution Act, 1982] by perperuaring the 
hisrorical injustice suffered by aboriginal peoples ar the hands of colonizers who 
failed to respecr" aboriginal rights ro land (COte, supra, at para. 53).63 
He also made it clear that "the fact that the nature of occupation has changed 
would not ordinarily preclude a claim for aboriginal title, as long as a substantial 
connection between the people and the land is maintained."64 Taken out of con-
text, statements such as these might be interpreted to mean that there is a general 
requirement of continuity for proof of Aboriginal rights and title. However, given 
that these passages all appear in his judgment under the heading "[i]f present 
occupation is relied on as proof of occupation pre-sovereignty, there must be a 
continuity between present and pre-sovereignty occupation,"65 it is apparent that 
he was limiting the application of the concept of continuity to that situation.66 
If Aboriginal title is proven by sufficient evidence of exclusive occupation of 
the claimed lands at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty, 67 Aboriginal title 
will have vested at common law in the Aboriginal occupants as a community at 
that historical moment. 68 Once vested, Aboriginal title continues until surrendered 
to the Crown or extinguished by clear and plain legislative enactment. 69 Moreover, 
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the burden of proving extinguishment of Aboriginal rights, including title, is on 
the Crown or other party so alleging.70 Given these well-established principles, it 
is understandable that Lamer C.J. limited the requirement of proving continuity 
to situations where present (or at least post-sovereignty) occupation is relied upon 
to prove occupation at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty.71 If Aboriginal 
people had to prove post-sovereignty continuity even in cases where occupation 
at the time of sovereignty had been established, they would be required in effect 
to prove that their title had not been extinguished or otherwise lost. In addition 
to conflicting with Supreme Court decisions involving Aboriginal rights, such 
a requirement would be inconsistent with common law principles regarding 
property rights. 
Once property and other legal rights, including rights arising from custom, 
are vested, they are presumed by the common law to continue until proven to 
have been extinguished, transferred, or otherwise relinquished.72 The application 
of this fundamental principle to personal property is revealed by the rule that a 
chattel, even if lost, is presumed not to have been abandoned in the absence of 
evidence that the owner intended to give up his or her rights to it.7' Regarding 
land, although tide can be statutorily extinguished by adverse possession for the 
limitation period in some jurisdictions, the onus of proving adverse possession 
for the requisite time is clearly on the person attempting to establish title in this 
way. 74 Discontinuance of possession by the paper-titleholder, for no matter how 
long, will not start the time period running unless someone else has actually 
acquired adverse possession of the land.75 
So even if Aboriginal title could be lost by failure to maintain a substantial 
connection with the land, common law principles would require that the Crown 
bear the onus of proving that that had happened. But is it even possible for 
Aboriginal title to be lost in this way? In Delgamuukw, ChiefJustice Lamer said 
that Aboriginal title "is a right to the land itself."76 Relying on Canadian Pacific 
Ltd. v. Paul,77 he rejected the notion that "aboriginal title is a non-proprieta1y 
interest which amounts to no more than a licence to use and occupy the land and 
cannot compete on an equal footing with other proprietary intcrests."78 Clearly, 
Aboriginal title is a real property interest, though it is unlike any other interest 
known to the common law because it is sui generis in several respects.79 Sratutory 
limitation periods aside, since at least Magna Carta of 1215 the common law has 
not permitted interests in land to be lost by the wrongful taking ofland, whether 
by private individuals or by tl1e Crown.80 This common law protection for property 
rights is so fundamental that it must extend to Aboriginal tide. 81 Dispossession of 
Aboriginal peoples should not, therefore, amount to the kind of discontinuance 
of connection with the land that might result in loss of ritle.82 
But could Aboriginal title be lost by discontinuance of the connection with 
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the land in circumstances amounting to abandonment? This is doubtful. At 
common law, lawful tide to land, once acquired, probably cannot be given up 
or lost by abandonment.83 It might be argued, however, that even if this is so, 
Aboriginal title is sui generis and therefore is not subject to a restriction arising 
mainly out of seisin and feudal conceptions of real property in England.84 Be that 
as it may, there are other reasons why Aboriginal tide probably cannot be lost 
by abandonment.85 First, it is held communally, and it appears that communal 
rights cannot be waived or abandoned, particularly where the interests of future 
generations would be jeopardized.86 And even if the Royal Proclamation of 1763 
authorized surrender of Aboriginal tide to the Crown,87 this had to be done at a 
public assembly, held for that purpose, of the Indian tribe or nation whose lands 
were involved. No informal surrender of Aboriginal title by abandonment was 
contemplated or sanctioned.88 There are thus good reasons for concluding that 
Aboriginal title cannot be lost by abandonment. But even if it could be, the onus 
of proving an intention to abandon would be on the party so alleging, and would 
not be easy to meet.89 
CONCLUSIONS 
Our examination of Chief Justice Lamer's decisions in Van der Peet, Gladstone, 
and Delgamuukw has revealed a consistent approach to the matter of continuity 
in regard to both Aboriginal title to land and other Aboriginal rights. 90 In these 
contexts, continuity involves a substantial maintenance of an Aboriginal people's 
pre-Crown sovereignty occupation of the land in the case of title, or of their pre-
European contact practices, customs, and traditions in the case of other Aboriginal 
rights. However, continuity of this sort has to be shown only when Aboriginal 
peoples rely on post-sovereignty occupation or post-contact practices, customs, 
and traditions as evidence of their pre-sovereignty occupation or pre-contact 
practices, customs, and traditions. If they are able to produce adequate direct 
evidence of their pre-sovereignty occupation or pre-contact practices, customs, 
and traditions, then proof of continuity from that time is unnecessary. In other 
words, continuity applies backward in time to sovereignty or contact, not forward 
in time from those moments in history. 
Although Lamer C.J. indicated in the cases we have discussed that, where 
post-sovereignty occupation or post-contact practices, customs, and traditions 
are relied upon, continuity must relate back to the time of Crown sovereignty 
or European contact, he also said that it is unnecessary to show "an unbroken 
chain of continuity."91 In addition to allowing for gaps, this must mean that it 
is unnecessary to show continuity all the way back to the time of sovereignty or 
contact, for if that could be shown then the occupation requisite for title at the 
time of sovereignty, or the practices, customs, and traditions requisite for other 
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Aboriginal rights at the time of contact, could be proven directly in most cases 
without any need to rely on post-sovereignty occupation or post-contact practices, 
customs, and traditions. As Lamer C.J .'s express intention in allowing post-sover-
eignty occupation and post-contact practices, customs, and traditions to be relied 
upon was to make proof of Aboriginal title and other Aboriginal rights easier,92 
proof as far back as sovereignty or contact should not be necessary. All that should 
be required is sufficient evidence of post-sovereignty occupation or post-contact 
practices, customs, and traditions to raise a presumption that the land was occupied 
at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty, or that the practices, customs, and 
traditions were in existence at the time of European contact.93 
So if proof of continuity back to Crown sovereignty or European contact is 
unnecessary, how far back does the evidence have to reach? The case law on Ab-
original rights and tide so far has not answered this question. There are, however, 
well-established rules regarding proof of custom in England, and in this respect 
English custom is closely analogous to the practices, customs, and traditions 
necessary to establish Aboriginal tide.94 Like Aboriginal practices, customs, and 
traditions, English custom must be proven from a particular historical moment: 
namely, 1189, when Richard I became king.95 As that is almost always impossible, 
judges have sensibly decided that evidence that the custom was in existence as far 
back as living witnesses can remember will raise a presumption that the custom 
existed in 1189 .96 The burden of rebutting the presumption then shifts to the party 
opposing the custom; it can be met by showing, for example, that the custom did 
not exist or could not have existed in 1189.97 This practical approach to proof of 
custom is supported by a legal maxim, by which courts are expected "to give effect 
to everything which appears to have been established for a considerable course 
of time, and to presume that what has been done was done of right, and not in 
wrong."98 As Bramwell L.J. said in lvlayor of Penryn v. Best, "every supposition, not 
wholly irrational, should be made in favour oflong-continued enjoyment."99 
The main rationale for holding that proof of a custom as far back as the 
memory of living witnesses goes is prima facie sufficient is to avoid placing an 
impossible burden of proof on those who seek to establish customs. As we have 
seen, Lamer C.J. used the same rationale in Van der Peet when he said that 
Aboriginal peoples can rely on post-European contact practices, customs, and 
traditions to establish their Aboriginal rights. 100 There is thus good reason to 
apply the same standard of proof in both these situations, so that proof that the 
relevant practice, custom, or tradition has been in place for as long as any wit-
nesses can remember will raise a presumption that it was in existence at the time 
of contact.101 As with custom in England, it would then be open to the Crown 
or other party contesting the Aboriginal right to prove that the practice, custom, 
or tradition has a more recent origin. 102 
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The presumption utilized by the courts in relation to proof of custom does 
not apply to proof of title to land. Real property interests have always been of such 
vital importance in the common law that the courts have developed a different set 
of rules where title to land is concerned. As I have already discussed the applica-
tion of these rules to Aboriginal title in detail elsewhere, 103 I will provide only a 
brief summary here. First of all, anyone who is in occupation ofland is presumed 
to have a valid title. 104 If occupation can be proven, 105 there is no need to show 
that it has been continuous for as far back as living witnesses can remember, or 
indeed for any period of time at all. The burden of rebutting the presumption of 
title arising from occupation is therefore on anyone who challenges the validity 
of the occupier's title. But the law goes even further in protecting the occupier, 
for those challenging the occupier's right to the land will succeed only if they can 
show that they either have a better ride than the occupier or are claiming the land 
on behalf of someone who has a better title. 106 It is not sufficient for challengers 
to prove that a third party has a better title, as that will not give them any right 
to acquire the lands themselves. These rules have been affirmed and applied in 
so many cases that their validity is beyond dispute. There is no doubt that they 
are fundamental to the common law of real property. 107 
As discussed elsewhere, there is no reason in principle why these rules in 
relation to proof of title to land generally should not apply to Aboriginal ritle. 10s 
Proof that an Aboriginal community had exclusive occupation of land at any 
time after Crown assertion of sovereignty should give rise to a presumption of 
Aboriginal title. 109 In other words, despite what Lamer C.J. said in Delgamuukw 
about proof of continuity being required if present occupation is relied upon, 110 
there should be no need to show continuity of occupation for a presumption 
of Aboriginal ride to arise, any more than there is a need to show continuity of 
occupation for any other occupier to have a presumptive title. If the Aboriginal 
community proves the requisite occupation,111 the burden should then be on the 
Crown, ifit disputes their title, to rebut the presumption of title by showing either 
that the land was unoccupied and therefore became Crown land unburdened by 
Aboriginal title at the time of assertion of sovereignty, or that the Aboriginal title 
was validly surrendered to the Crown or extinguished by legislation at some time 
after sovereignty had been asserted. Failing that, the presumptive Aboriginal title 
should prevail. 
Canadian courts often treat Aboriginal claims as if the issues raised are ones of 
first impression. In one sense, this is appropriate, because these claims are unique to 
the circumstances of the Aboriginal peoples and their historical relationships with 
the Crown, and do involve complex cross-cultural issues, including the interplay 
of very different legal systems. 112 However, in contexts where there are relevant 
principles and rules in the common law that could be adapted and applied to 
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Aboriginal claims without discounting Aboriginal difference and distorting their 
rights, 113 judges should at least take those principles and rules into consideration. 
In particular, if the common law would provide advantages to Aboriginal peoples 
in proving or defending their rights, judges should have very good reasons for not 
extending the benefit of the common law to them.114 Regarding proof of Aboriginal 
rights, including Aboriginal title to land, the common law does contain principles 
and rules that would help alleviate the heavy burden that Aboriginal peoples face 
in establishing their rights. As judges develop the concept of continuity that the 
Supreme Court has sketched out in this context, they should be informed by 
these principles and rules and apply them in ways that do not cause Aboriginal 
peoples to be disadvantaged. 
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of infringement of treaty rights should be rreared in the same manner as justification of infringement 
of Aboriginal rights: see B11dger, supra note 3 ar paras. 74-79, Cory J.; Marsht1ll l, supra note 3 at 
para. 64, Binnie J.; lv!arshall lf, supr11 note 3 at para. 32. For a contrary view, see Leonard I. Rotman, 
"Defining Parameters: Aboriginal Rights, Treary Rights, and the Sp11rrow Justificatory Test" (1997) 
36 Alberta L. Rev. 149. 
5J In Sioui, the clause of the treaty being relied upon probably did just that. It provided that the 
Hurons were "allowed the free Exercise of their Religion, their Customs, and Liberty of trading with 
rhe English" (Siotti, supra note 3 at 1031 ), and the accused were exercising their religion and customs 
when char<>ed under provincial legislation. See also Simon, supra note 3 at 409, where Dickson C.J. 
held rhat, :ven though the Micmac Treaty of 1752 "did not crettte new hunting or fishing rights bur 
merely recognized pre-existing rights" [emphasis in original], it was still a treaty for the purposes of 
s. 88 of the Indian Act, supra note 49. 
5·1 The issue of whether continuity must be shown as far back as European contact will be discussed 
below in the Conclusions to this paper. 
is Although the issue cannot be discussed here, surrender of Aboriginal rights may be problematic 
because, as Lamer C.J. made clear in Delgmnuukw, supra note 5 at paras. 115, 125-32, they are 
communal rights rhat are intended to benefit future as well as present generations. As Lord Denning 
observed in rhe quo ration from iVy!d accompanying note 44, one generation should not be able to 
waive or abandon communal rights on behalf of future generations. See also Leroy Little Bear, ''Ab-
oriainal Riahts and the Canadian 'Grundnorm'" in J. Rick Ponting, ed., Arduous Journey: Ct1nadian 
Jndi11ns and Decolonization (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986) 243; McNeil, supra note 47 
at 304-8. However, the Royal Proclamation of 1763, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 1, may 
have provided authority for the surrender of Aboriginal land rights. Moreover, the surrenderabiliry 
of Aboriginal tide to the Crown was affirmed by Lamer C.J. in Delgamuukw at par~. 131 (withour 
reference to the Royal Proclamation), despite the inherent limit that prevents uses of the land by the 
Aboriginal rirleholders "which are inconsistent with continued use by future generations of aboriginals" 
(para. 154). For critical commentary on the inherent limit, see Kem McNeil, "The Posr-Delgamuukw 
Nature and Content of Aboriginal Tide" in McNeil, Emerging justice?, supra note 2, 102 at 116-22 
[McNeil, "Posr-Delgamuukw"J. . . 
56 See McNeil, supra note 47. In Delgarnuukw, ibid. at paras. 172-83, Lamer C.]. held that provmc1al 
legislatures have had no jurisdiction since Confederation to extinguish Aboriginal rights because ~hos~ 
rights are within the core of federal jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the '.nd1".11s 
(Constitution Act, I867(U.K.) 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3, s. 91 (24)), and so are protected agamst extmgmsh-
menr by provincial laws by the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. . . 
" See stpra note 32, and notes 43-46 and accompanying rexr. This protect10n 1s part of_rhe res~ect 
that rhe common law accords to vested rights generally, as there is a strong presumpnon agamsr 
legislative interference with them: see e.g. Spooner Oils Ltd v. Tia-ner Valley Gas Conservation Boa:d, 
[ 1933] S.C.R. 629 ar 638, Duff C.J.; Attormy-General for Canad11 v. Hallet 11nd Carey Ltd, [19)2] 
A.C. 427 (P.C.), esp. at 450, Lord Radcliffe; Colet v. The Queen, [1981] I S.C.R. 2 at IO; Ruth Sul-
livan, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 4th ed. (Markham, Ont.: Butterworrhs, 
2002) at 412-16. 
ss Delgmnuukw, supra note 5, especially at paras. 78-108, Lamer C.!. T~e ~ase was therefor~ sent 
back ro trial, though a re-trial has nor taken place. On use of oral h1stones m court, see Lon Ann 
Roness & Kent McNeil, "Legalizing Oral History: Proving Aboriginal Claims in Canadian Courrs" 
(2000) 39:3 Journal of the West 66; John Borrows, "Listening for a Change: The Courts and Oral 
Tradition" (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. I. 
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59 
For discussion of Larner C.J.'s definition of Abor1"<>1nal · l 
supra note 55. "' ttt e, see McNeil, "Post-Delgamuukw," 
60 Delgamuukw, supra note 5 at para. 143. 
61 
Ibid. at pa.ra. 152 [emphasis in original]. See also paras 83 101 Nore that La ForA•srJ · 
· h l · ' · ...,. ., concurnncr 
tn t . e r~su t;, took a '.11ore flexible approach to continuity where present occupation is relied upon~ 
In his vte\~, commmry .may still exisr where the presenr occupation of one area is connected to rhe 
pre-sovereignty occu~at10n of another area": ibid. at para.· 197 (see also para. 198). 
63 
See text accornpanymg no:es 10-13. See also lvlarshtt!l, supra note 12 at paras. 178-81. 
Delgamuukw, supm nore ) at para. 153. Regarding Cott, see supra nore 21. 
Delgamuukw, zbul. at para. 154. 
65 lbid. before para. 152 [underlining removed]. 
"'S · l .b.d 
ee aso t 2 ·at para. 151.' where Larner C.J. said that "in the case of ride, it would seem clear 
that any. land d1ar :vas occupied pr~-s.overeignry, and which the parries have maintained a substantial 
conne~tton '~'.th smce then, ts suffic1enrly important to be of central significance to rhe culture of 
'.he d~imanr~ (see also 1b1d. ~er La. Forest J. at para. 199). Once again, the chief justice's obvious 
mremio~ was ro make p.roof ot Abongmal ride easier by nor requiring the clairnanrs actually to prove 
rhar their connectton w1rh the land was of central significance to rheir distinctive culture, as per rhe 
Vtm der J_'eet test. Surely he could not have meant rhar they must show rhat rhey have mainrained a 
subsranttal con.necno~ with the la~d since sovereignty in all cases, given rhat he went on to explain, in 
the paragraphs 1mmed1~tdy followmg, that continuity must be shown "[i]f present occupation is relied 
0
,n .as proof of occupatton .pre-sovereignty": ibid., heading before para. 152 (underlining removedl. 
1 his was confirmed by Daigle J.A. m R. v. Bernard (2003), 230 D.L.R. (4th) 57 (N.B.C.A.) at par~. 
i,8 [Bernard], wh~ ~aid that ~amer C.J:'s ~equirernent in Delgamuukw for continuity as an element 
or proof ~f Abongmal ttde only applies m cases where present occupation is relied on as p f t' 
pre sove e · " ( l ' roo o 
, - r tgnty occupanon see a so paras. 131-32). Leave to appeal Bernard was "tamed by rhe ~up:ei_ne Court ~f Ca~ada on 29 April 2004, (2004] 2 C.N.L.R. iv. "' 
'Dtffic~~r que.sr~ons ans~ as ro when this might have occurred in various parts of C,anada: see e.g. Kem 
McNeil, Abongmal N~ttom and Quebec's Boundaries: Canada Couldn't Give What Ir Didn't Have" in 
McNeil, Emergmgjusttce?, supra note 2, I. In its recent decision in Bernard, ibid., rhe New Brunswick 
C~urr of A~peal ac~epred the trial judge's ruling rhar British sovereignty over the Northwest Miramichi 
Rt:'~r ~ea Ill what ts. now northern New Brumwick had been acquired in 1759, as that was when the 
Brmsh took possession of the land" or acquired "de facto control over the area": para. 61 D · I J A. 
see also paras. 443, 446, Robertson ].A. Sec also Marshall, supra note 12 at para. 73, whe~e ~~~:~eil 
~--'~ ~tated tha~ there was n~ dispute on appeal over the trial judge's findings that British sovereignty 
68
a een acquired over mamland Nova Scotia in 1713 and over Cape Breton in 1763. ' 
. In Delga~umkw, supra note 5 at para. 145, Lamer C.J. said that "aboriginal tide crystallized at rhe 
nrne sovereignty was asserted." 
69 I D t 
n ~gamuu~w, Lamer C.J. affirmed that Aboriginal tide, like other Aboriginal rights could b 
exttngu1shed pnor tO the enactment of s. 35 of rhe Constitution Act 1982 on! b 1 · ' d I · e I · -I · . . , ' y y c ear an p am 
egis atton enacted by a consmunonally cornpetenr legislative body· ibid at para 180 R d" 
surre 1d f Ab · · l · I · · ' · · egar mg i er o ongma me, see supra note 55 and infra notes 86-87. d · 
70 See supra note 32. ' an accornpanymg text. 
71 H~wever, an argument will be made i'.1 th~ Conclusions to this paper that the requirement that 
1
1
'\bongmal peoples ac~ually prove conttnuity ot their occupation even in this context offends common 
aw prmciples 1ll relat10n to ride ro land. 
71 
See aurhor:ti~ cited supm in. notes 37-38, 42-45. See also Moffet v. Kazana, [1969] 2 Q.B. l52 
at 156, where \X rangham J. said that the owners of the money in question in the case "remain the 
true m~ners of the money unless rhey ... had divested ... themselves of the ownership by one of the 
recogrnsed methods, abandonment, gift or sale." 
See Wj_lliarnsv. Phillips(1~57), 41Cr.App.R.5 (U.K. Div. Cr.); Simpson v. Gowers(l981), 32 0.R. 
(2dJ,~8) /C.A.). For discussion, see A.H. Hudson, "Is Divesting Abandonment Possible at Common 
Law. (1984) 100 Law Q. Rev. 110. The rule that there must be an intention to abandon applies to 
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real property as well in the context of easements and profits a prendre: see Swan v. Sincktir, [1924] 1 
Ch. 254 (C.A.), affd [1925] AC. 227 (H.L.); Gotobed, supra note 38; Tehidy, supra note 38. 
See Keefer v. Arillotta (l 976), 13 O.R. (2d) 680 (C.A.); Masidon investments Ltd. v. Ham (l 984), 
45 O.R. (2d) 563 (C.A.) [Masidon !nvestments];j.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. Graham, [2003] 1A.C.419 
(H.L.) at 427, Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
75 Wallis's Cayton Bay Holiday Camp Ltd. v. Shell-Mex, [1974] 3 All E.R. 575 (C.A.), applied in Masidon 
Investments, ibid. See also Eileen E. Gillese, Property Luo: Cases, Text and lvfflteria!s, 2nd ed. (Toronto: 
Emond Montgomery, 1990) at 12:8. 
76 Delgamuukw, supra note 5 at para. 140 [emphasis in original]. 
(1988] 2 S.C.R. 654 at 677. 
78 Delgamuukw, supra note 5 at para. 113. 
79 !bid. at paras. 112-15. For discussion, see McNeil, "Post-Delgamuukw," supra note 55. 
80 For detailed discussion, see Kem McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1989) at 18-63, 93-95 [McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title]. 
81 See Kent McNeil, "Aboriginal Tide as a Constitutionally Protected Property Righr" and "Racial 
Discrimination and Unilateral Exringuishmenr of Native Tide" in McNeil, Emergingj1mice?, supra 
note 2, 292 and 357, respectively. 
"Lamer C.J. suggested this himself in Delgamuukw, supm note 5 at para. l 53, when he gave the fol-
lowing reason why 'an unbroken chain of continuiry" need not be established: "The occupation and 
use oflands may have been dismpred for a rime, perhaps as a result of the unwillingness of European 
colonizers ro recognize aboriginal title." See also rhe quotation accompanying note 63, supra. 
83 See Jones v. lvfcLean, [1931] 2 D.L.R. 244 (Man. C.A.) at 247, Prendergast C.J.M., at 252, Fullerton 
J.A. See also McNeil, Common LC1wAboriginal Title, supra note 80 at 63-73. 
84 The common law abhorred an abeyance of seisin, in part because that would mean no one was 
responsible for the feudal services and incidents of tenure. This is probably what led Maitland to 
remark that "[i]t seems very doubtful whether a man could (or can) get rid of a seisin once acquired, 
except by delivering seisin to some one else": Frederick Pollock & Frederic William Maitland, The 
History of English Law Before the Ttme of Edward!, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1898, reissued 1968), vol. 2 at 55 n. 2. 
85 It should be noted that American law apparently does allow Indian ride to be lost by abandonment: 
see e.g. United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691 (1832) at 747-48; Williams v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 434 
(1917); United States v. Santa Fe Ptzcific Railroad, 314 U.S. 339 (1941) at 354-58; Turtle Mountain 
Band of Chippewa Indians v. United States, 490 F.2d 935 (1974) at 947-48. However, Indian ride 
in the United Stares is a non-proprietary right of occupancy: Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 
348 U.S. 272 (1955). As Aboriginal ride in Canada is an interest in land that is proprietary (see 
text accompanying notes 76-79), rhis aspect of American law is inapplicable here. See discussion in 
McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra nore 80 at 258-67. Compare Ontario (A.G.) v. Bear 
Island Foundation, [1985] 1 C.N.L.R. 1 (Ont. S.C.) at 77, where Steele]. found, inter alia, that 
rhe Aboriginal ride of the Ternagami Indians had been extinguished because they "abandoned their 
traditional use and occupation" ofrheir lands. Although his decision was affirmed on appeal, [1989] 
2 C.N.L.R. 73 (Ont. C.A.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 570, the Supreme Court did not mention abandon-
ment, holding only rhar the Temagami Indians' land rights had been validly surrendered by adhe-
sion to a treaty. Moreover, at 575, the Supreme Court said it did "nor necessarily follow" from their 
acceptance of Steele J .'s factual findings that they agreed "with all rhe legal findings based on those 
facts. In particular, we find that on the facts found by the trial judge the Indians exercised sufficient 
occupation of the lands in question throughout rhe relevant period to establish an aboriginal right." 
The Court said that Steele]. had been misled in this regard by certain considerations, including his 
finding that the Temagarni Indians bad failed ro prove "that, as an organized society, they continued 
ro exclusively occupy and make aboriginal use of the Land Claim Area from 1763 or the rime of 
coming of settlement to the dare rhe action was commenced": ibid. at 574-75, quoting [1985] I 
C.N.L.R. 1 at 21. For further discussion, see Kent McNeil, "The High Cost of Accepting Benefits 
from the Crown: A Comment on the Temagarni Indian Land Case" in McNeil, Emerging justice?, 
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supra note 2, 25 [McNeil, "High Cost"]. 
86 
Sec the quotation from ttyld accompanying note 44. 
87 See supra note 55. 
88 
On the Royal Proclamation's requiremenrs for the surrender of Aboriginal tide, see Brian Slattery, ~he Land Rights of ln.d1genous Canadian Peoples (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Narive Law 
Cenrre, 1?79)., especially at 312-13; McNeil, "High Cost," supra note 85 at 41-48. See also Chi_ 
pewas of Sanua Ban~ v. Canada ('.4.G.) (!999), 40 R.ER. (3d) 49 (Onr. Sup. Cr.), aff'd [200ltl 
C.N.L.R. 56 (Onr. C.A.), leave to appeal refosed [2001] 3 S.C.R. vi, S.C.C.A. No. 63. However in 
Gnppewas of Samia the Court of Appeal, in obiter at paras. 206-19, affirmed its conrroversial rul;ng 
m Ontarw (A.G.) v. Bear ls!tmd Foundation, supra note 85, that the surrender provisions of the Ro al 
Proclamanon had been repealed by the Quebec Act (U.K) J 4 Geo 3 83 F . · · al y 
see McNeil, ibid. at 42-44. . ' . 'c. . OI crmc commemary, 
89 S . fr 
ee quoranon om Re Yate!ey Common accompanyin<> note 37. See also Gotob-d v. Pn' J 
38 N l · "' •· · umore, supra 
note · ore nar m Marshall, supra note 12 at para 741 Crom\vell J A d. · . d h C ' 
· - , . . 1srn1sse t e rowns 
argument rhar. loss of conne_crion w'.rh :he hnd amounted to abandonment. In doing so, he relied 
on his conclusion that proot of contmmty IS nor required where exclusive occupation at rhe rime of 
Cr.own sovereignty has been established by direct evidence. He also found on rhe facts that abandon-
ment had nor occurred. 
90 
Although Adams, supra note 19, and Cote, supra note 21, discussed suhra in nores 19-23 d 
accompa · h · d. r an 
nymg text, m1g t m Icate some confusion regarding this matter 1 u1·1nk th. · d · 
· f , ' Is Is ue ro map-
propnare use .o the term 'continuity" in the context of rhe requirement rhar rhe present-dav acrivirv 
must come Withm the scope ~f the ~boriginal right that has been shown ro exist. See also discussio~ 
:,r note 23, mpra, ofMcLachlm C.J.s decision in Mitchell, supra note 23. 
1'ttn der R:et, supra n~re 4 at para. 65, repeated, in the context of Aboriginal ride, in De!gamuukw 
supra note ) at para. l )3. ' 
Sec text accompanying notes 1 O and 61. 
~3 An apprnach like this was taken by Merkel J. in the Federal Court of Australia in his recent decision 
m Rub1b1 Commumty v. Western Australia (2001) Jl2 FC R 409 79 )" , . . . at para 
'' Alrh~ugh rhe ma.n.er canno.t be pursued in this paper, an examinario~ of how customary law is 
pro;~n m former Brmsh colornes elsewhere might provide usefol parallels as well. For an introduction 
to_. IS complex matter, see A.N. Allon, "The Judicial Ascertainment of Customa L· · B · · h 
Afnca" (!957) 20 Mod. L. Rev. 244. ry aw m rms 
~5 See Ha!sbury's Laws ofEngland, supra note 41, vol. 12(!) at paras. 607-8, 620-22. 
'" Sec]enkim v. Harvey (l 835), l C.M. & R. 877 (Ex.) at 894; Bastard v. Smith ( l 837), 2 M. & Rob, 
~29 (Q.B~ ar 136 [Bastard]; Hammerton v. Honey (1876), 24 WR. 603 (H.C.) at 604 [Hammerton]· 
C~~3~ (:;_~;'. (1877), 3 Q.B.D. 85 at !04; Mercer v. Denne, [1904] 2 Ch. 534, aff'd [1905] ~ 
97 See Bastard, ibid. ar 136; Hammerton, ibid at 604. 
9~ Gibson v. Doeg(1857), 2 H. &N. 615 (Ex.) at623, Pollock C.B., applied by Joyce]. ro acustomar ~;ghr to quarry stone on r~e waste of a manor in Heath, ;~tpra note 43 at 93. y 
(1878), 3 Ex. D. 292 (C.A.) ar 299, applied in Heath, ibid at 93. See also Cocksedge v Fanshaw 
(1779), l Doug. K.B. 119 at 1?2; Roe d. Johnson v. Ireland (l 809), 11 East 280 (K.B.) at 2S4; Brock-
lebank v. Thompson, [1903] 2 Ch. 344 at 350; Egerton v. Harding, [1975] Q.B. 62 (C.A.). InAttome 
Generalv.Lort!Hothttm(1823),Turn.&R.209(Ch.)ar2l8 PlumerMR ·d·"" h' h. d h )' 
. 'd h· . . . ' · .sa1 · very Ig JU ges ave ~~'st ey would presur:'e any dung m favour of a long enjoyment and uninterrupted possession." 
ee text accompanymg note 10. 
101 
The rule that a cusrom is presumed to be valid if shown to be in existence for as far back as Jiving 
n:en:'o~.goes was a~plied in .Canada in the context of an Inuit custom of adoption by rhe Northwest 
1erntones Court of Appeal rn Kztchooalik, supra note 45 at 488, relying on Bastar.d S · h 
note 96. v. mu , supra 
'
0
' Compare ~Heureux-Dube J. 's dissentingjudgmcms in Vtm der Peet, supra note 4 at paras. 164-79 
andR.v.N.7.CSmokehouseLtd.,[1996]2S.C.R.672atparas 4)- 62 73 h h · dL ' 
. , , , w ere s e n.!Jecte amer 
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C.]. 's pre-contact time frame for proof of Aboriginal rights, advocating instead an approach that would 
recognize rights based on practices, customs, and traditions that have been integral to distinctive 
Aboriginal cultures "for a substantial continuous period of time": 1'an der Peet at para. 175 [emphasis 
in original]. She said that the actual length of this period "will depend on the circumstances and on 
rhe nature of the aboriginal right claimed," but suggested that it should be in the range of twenty to 
fifty years: ibid at para. 177, relying on Brian Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Righrs" (1987) 
66 Can. Bar Rev. 727 at 758. See also her concurring judgments in Gladstone, supra note 16 at paras. 
133-35, 143-45, and Ad;tms, supra note 19 at para. 66. Her twenty- to fifty-year period is similar 
ro the period char will usually suffice ro raise a presumption of a valid custom at common law: see 
Ha!sbury's Laws of England, supra note 41, vol. 12(!) at para. 622. However, unlike in rhe case of 
English custom, CHeureux-Dube J. does not appear to have envisaged that proof of an Aboriginal 
right could be rebutted by evidence of non-existence of the practice, custom, or tradition before the 
twenty- to fifty-year period. 
103 See Kent McNeil, "The Onus of Proof of Aboriginal Tide" (l 999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 775, 
reprinted in McNeil, Emerging justice?, supra note 2, 136 [McNeil, "Onus of Proof"]. 
10
·i See Whale v. Hitchcock (!876), 34 LT 136 (Div. C.A.); Emmerson v. Maddison, [1906] A.C. 569 
(P.C.) at 575; Wheeler v. Baldwin (1934), 52 C.L.R. 609 (H.C.A.), esp. at 621-22; Allen v. Roughley 
(1955), 94 C.LR. 98 (H.C.A.) at 136-41. This presumption is usually expressed as a presumption 
of ride from possession, bur since possession (a matter of law) is presumed from occupation (a matter 
of fact), it is nor necessary in this context ro distinguish between them. On the difference between 
occupation and possession, see McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, supm note 80 at 6-8. 
103 On proof of occupation, see McNeil, ibid at 197-204. 
106 See Roe d. Haldane and Urry v. Harvey (1769), 4 Burr. 2484 (K.B.) ar 287-88; Goodtit!e d. Parker 
v. Ba!t!win (1809), 11 East 488 (K.B.) at 495; Asher v. iVhit!JJck (!865), LR. 1 Q.B. l; Danford v. 
McAmtlty (!883), 8 App. Cas. 456 (H.L) at 460-61, 462, 464-65; Perry v. Clisso!t!, [1907] A.C. 73 
(P.C.) ar 79-80; City ofVancouverv. 1'ancouver Lumber Company, [191 l] A.C. 711 (P.C.) at 720; McAl-
lister v. Defoe (1915), 8 0.WN. 175 (Ont. K.B.), aff'd (1915), 8 O.W.N. 405 (Ont. C.A.); Swaile v. 
Zurdayk, (1924] 2 WW.R. 555 (Sask. C.A.); Pinder Lumber and Milting Co. v. Munroe, [1928] S.C.R. 
177; Oxford Meat Co. Pty. v. McDona!t!, [1963] S.R.(N.S.W) 423 (N.S.WS.C.) at 425-27. 
107 For confirmation of these rules in leading texts, see Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of 
the Laws of England; or a Commentary upon Littleton, 19th ed. by Charles Buder (London: J. and WT. 
Clarke et al., 1832) at 239a, n. I; William Blackstone, Commentaries on the LawsofEngltmd, 16th ed. 
(London: T. Cadell and J. Butterworth and Son, 1825) vol. 2 at 196, vol. 3 at 177, 180; Frederick 
Pollock & Robert Samuel Wright, An Essay on Possession in the Common Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1888) at 22-25, 91-100; John M. Lightwood, A 7i-eatise on Possession of Land (London: Stevens and 
Sons, 1894) at 125, 146-47, 294-95; Robert Mcgarry & William Wade, The Law of Real Property, 
6rh ed. by Charles Harpum (London: Sweet & Ma.xwell, 2000) at 87-94; E.H. Burn, Cheshire and 
Bum's Modern Law o}Real Property, 15th ed. (London: Butterworrhs, 1994) at 26-29; Ht1!sbury's Laws 
of England, supra note 41, vol. 39(2) at para. 267. For discussion and forther references, see McNeil, 
Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 80 at 42-43, 46-49, 56-58. 
108 See McNeil, "Onus of Proof," supm note 103. 
109 If exclusive occupation ar the rime of Crown assertion of sovereignty is proven, then of course an 
actual Aboriginal ride will have been established, nor just a presumptive title . 
"
0 See text accompanying note 60. 
111 Past as well as present occupation should give rise to this presumption of Aboriginal ride: see McNeil, 
"Onus of Proof," supra note !03 at 794-96 (Emerging]ustice?ar 152-54). 
112 See generally John Borrows, Recovering Canada: 1he Resurgence oj1ndigenous Law (Toronto: University 
ofToronto Pr=, 2002). 
113 For an insightfo! discussion of ways in which courrs have used Aboriginal difference (and sameness) 
ro rhe disadvantage of Aboriginal peoples, see Patrick Maddern, "First Nations Self-Government and the 
Borders of the Canadian Legal Imagination" (1991) 36 McGill L.J. 382. 
114 See articles cited in note 81, supra. Admittedly, the Supreme Court has said on occasion that common 
150 KENT McNEIL 
law property principles do not necessarily apply ro Aboriginal rights and tide, given the latter's sui generis 
nature: see e.g. Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 at 381--82, Dickson].; Sparrow, supnz note 
32 at 1112; St. Mary's Indian Band v. Cranbrook (City), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 657 at paras. 14--16. However, 
the reasons the Court has generally given for this are ro avoid distortion of Aboriginal rights and title by 
inappropriately trying to fit them into common law categories, to respect the intentions of Aboriginal 
peoples and the Crown when they negotiate agreements, and to prevent injustice. These goals are nor 
inconsistent with applying common law principles that would assist.Aboriginal peoples in cl1e often dif-
ficttlt msk of proving or defending their rights. 
